No, I find it interesting. I do think that he should have explicitly included premises: Ultimately, the premise that it is moral to extend altruism based on presumed ability to suffer is as arbitrary as the premise that it is moral to extend altruism based on species identity. (Arguably it is more arbitrary in that we are evolutionarily preconditioned to intraspecific loyalty, but that’s not a valid argument that it is therefore more moral.) That said, I do lean somewhat in the former direction (with aspects of the latter), though it’s fairly clear that you and I have very different beliefs and opinions in the quantitative questions of where the lines should be drawn.

I’m kind of curious, though: Do you believe that humans and non-human animals are morally equivalent (in the sense of rights morally afforded, not requirements as moral agents)? If so, how do you justify the difference in your attitude and behaviour toward murderers (of other humans) and those who kill animals—between cannibals and (non-cannibal) non-vegetarians? If not, what are your criteria for moral distinction? Why are you willing to have civilised conversations with those who kill, or condone the killing of cows, but not those who kill, or condone the killing of people? (Or are you?)

Of course, I may be asking this question to thin air since I’ve no idea whether you go back and check responses to comments left days ago (does LJ notify anonymous commenters?). In any case, I didn’t take so long because I’m lazy, but because I genuinely think that these ideas are best digested before they are responded to.